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Abstract
This paper analyses the eﬀects on economic agents’ behaviour of an
innovative environmental protection mechanism that the Public Admin-
istration of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting
the environment. On the one hand, the Public Administration sells to
the tourists an environmental call option that gives them the possibility
of being (partially or totally) reimbursed if the environmental quality in
the region turns out to be unsatisfactory (i.e. below a given threshold
level). On the other hand, it oﬀers the ﬁrms that adopt an innovative,
non-polluting technology an environmental put option that allows them
to get a reimbursement for the additional costs imposed by the new tech-
nology if the environmental quality is suﬃciently good (i.e. above the
threshold level).
The aim of the paper is to study the dynamics that arise with this
ﬁnancial mechanism from the interaction between the economic agents and
the Public Administration in an evolutionary game context. The evolution
of visitors and ﬁrms’ behaviour is modeled in the paper using the so-called
replicator dynamics, according to which a given choice spreads across
the population as long as its expected payoﬀ is greater than the average
payoﬀ. From the model it emerges that such dynamics may lead either to a
welfare-improving attractive Nash equilibrium in which all ﬁrms adopt the
environmental-friendly technology or to a Pareto-dominated equilibrium
with no technological innovation and no tourism. As shown in the paper,
the attraction basin of the virtuous equilibrium will be maximum if total
reimbursement is oﬀered by the Public Administration to the visitors and
will be minimum if a simple entrance ticket is imposed on the tourists
with no chance of reimbursement.
Keywords: environmental bonds; call and put options; technological
innovation; evolutionary dynamics
∗Address of corresponding author: Simone Borghesi, Dept. Law, Economics and Govern-
ment, University of Siena, via Mattioli 10, I-53100 Siena, Italy. Tel: +39-0577-289495, fax:
+39-0577-235208, email: borghesi@unisi.it
11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Environmental problems deriving from economic activity and the suitable pol-
icy measures to reduce them have been the object of a heated debate among
economists in the last decades. Among the many proposals set forth to decrease
pollution and/or protect the environment, much attention has been devoted in
the literature to the introduction of speciﬁc ﬁnancial assets that can integrate
the traditional operating of the public sector by providing market incentives to
achieve environmental objectives.
One of the most relevant examples of ﬁnancial assets that can be issued
in accordance with environmental purposes is constituted by the so-called En-
vironmental Bond (EB), introduced by Perrings (1987 and 1989).1 The EB
is a mandatory deposit paid to the public administration by any agent whose
activity may damage the environment. The deposit is (totally or partially) re-
fundable if the holder of the bond can prove to the regulation authority that
he/she avoided the expected environmental damage of his/her activity. The EB
represents, therefore, an incentive-based instrument of environmental risk con-
trol (Costanza and Perrings, 1990) and can be conceived as a generalization of
t h ed e p o s i t - r e f u n ds y s t e m st h a th a v eb e e na p p l i e di nd i ﬀerent contexts charac-
terized by environmental risk, like compulsory deposits on waste lubricant oil,
junked cars, beverage containers, dangerous substances contained in materials
or products and so on (cf. Bohm, 1981; Huppes, 1988).2
The EB shares some common features with other policy instruments, like
marketable permits, environmental taxes and subsidies. For instance, as some
authors have pointed out (Torsello and Vercelli, 1998), the EB can be considered
symmetrical to tradeable permits. In the latter case, the regulatory authority
establishes the total quantity of the permits leaving their price to be deter-
mined by decentralized market decisions; while in the case of an EB system,
the authority ﬁxes the price of the EB, or risk premium for the possible damages
caused to the environment, leaving the market free to determine the quantity
of EB.
Moreover, the EB can be regarded as the joint implementation of an en-
vironmental tax (the price of the EB) and a potential subsidy (the refund),
but it is often considered politically more attractive than these two alternative
ﬁscal measures taken separately. In an EB system, in fact, subsidies (refunds)
are self-ﬁnanced by taxes (deposits), therefore -diﬀerently from environmental
subsidies- the EB does not imply any worsening of the public budget. More-
over, the prospective of a refund often makes the EB more acceptable to public
opinion than the environmental taxes, since in the EB the punishment is pro-
portional to the damage eﬀectively produced and the refund is received only by
the agents who can prove to deserve them.
1Although Perrings was the ﬁrst to use this term, a similar policy instrument had been
previously suggested by Solow (1971) and Mills (1972) who had proposed the introduction of
a material disposal tax.
2See also Gerard and Wilson (2009) for a possible application of EB to the nascent carbon
sequestration projects.
2The idea originally set forth by Perrings has been subsequently further de-
veloped by Horesh (2000, 2002a and 2002b) who proposed a slightly diﬀerent
kind of EB that are auctioned by the Public Administration (PA)o nt h eo p e n
market, but, unlike ordinary bonds, can be redeemed at the face value only if
as p e c i ﬁed environmental objective has been achieved. They do not bear any
interest, and the yield investors can gain depends on the diﬀerence between the
auctioned price and the face value in the case of redemption. Economic agents
involved in the environmental objective (either polluters or not), once in pos-
s e s s i o no ft h eb o n d s ,h a v eas t r o n gi n t e r e s tt oo p e r a t ei ns u c haw a yt h a tt h e
objective itself is quickly achieved, so to cash in the expected gains as soon as
possible.
In our paper we follow a rather diﬀerent path, proposing two ﬁnancial ac-
tivities, issued by the PA of a tourist region (R), which work like contracts
between the PA and, respectively, visitors and ﬁrms operating in R -a n dc a n
be regarded as (cash-or-nothing) environmental call (EC) and environmental
put (EP) options. More speciﬁcally, the context we analyse has the following
features.
An individual who desires to spend a period of time in the region R has
to purchase the environmental call (EC) sold by the PA at a given price e p.
This implies a cost for the visitor in the case of a satisfactory environmental
quality, that is, when a properly deﬁned environmental quality index Q is above
a given threshold level Q ﬁxed by the PA (the value of Q being evaluated by an
independent authority); but oﬀers the visitor the possibility of a reimbursement
in the case of low environmental quality (namely, when Q<Q). Consequently,
buying the EC represents a self-insurance device that allows the visitor to “buy
protection” against environmental degradation. Thus, potential visitors have to
choose between the following strategies:
(V1) visit the region R (and consequently buy the EC)
(V2) do not visit the region.
Analogously, the PA oﬀers to a potentially polluting ﬁrm operating in the
region R the choice between subscribing or not the environmental put option
(EP) issued by the PA.T h i sﬁnancial activity is a contract, which binds the
ﬁrm to adopt a new environmental-friendly technology, thus bearing a supple-
mentary cost given by the diﬀerence between the cost of the new, non polluting
technology (cNP) and that of the old, polluting technology (cP), and implies
a ﬁnancial aid for the ﬁrm only if the environmental quality index Q results
higher than the threshold level Q.
Therefore, potentially polluting ﬁr m sh a v et oc h o o s eb e t w e e nt h ef o l l o w i n g
strategies:
(F1) adopting the new environmental-friendly technology (and subscribing
the EP)
(F2) carrying on its activity with the polluting technology in the region R.
We will assume the value of Q to depend on the number of ﬁrms choosing
the environment-preserving technology, i.e. subscribing the EP.
Hence, if Q<Q, the visitors choosing V1 receive a reimbursement for the
low environmental quality experienced during the period spent in R,w h i l et h e
3ﬁrms choosing F1 do not receive any ﬁnancial aid. If, on the contrary, Q ≥ Q,
the visitors choosing V1 bear a cost but can enjoy high environmental quality in
region R,w h i l et h eﬁrms choosing F1 receive ﬁnancial support for their invest-
ments aimed at protecting the environment. In this way, the PA can achieve
the goal of improving the environmental quality at a relatively low cost. As a
matter of fact, both visitors and ﬁrms have an incentive to protect the environ-
ment, the former in order to enjoy a better environmental quality in region R,
the latter in order to get ﬁnancial aid. Therefore, the costs born by the PA to
ﬁnance the ﬁrms that subscribe the EP can be compensated by the revenues
the PA cashes in from selling the EC to the visitors.
The PA determines prices and reimbursements taking into account, among
other things, the number of visitors and ﬁrms aiming to subscribe the ﬁnan-
cial activities as well as the cost of the environment-preserving technological
innovation.
The ﬁnancial activities proposed here resemble, under certain aspects, the
deposit-refund system implicit in the EB, but diﬀers from it in other respects.
In the EB the burden of the proof falls on the holder, which is often considered
to be an attractive feature of the EB. However, this does not eliminate the mon-
itoring costs for the regulatory authority that has to verify the evidence brought
forward by the EB holders that their negative externalities were actually lower
than expected. On the contrary, the regulatory authority may ﬁnd it diﬃcult
and expensive to attribute the responsibility for a certain damage to a poten-
tial polluter (due to asymmetric information, scientiﬁc uncertainty, non-point
sources and so on). In the present case, instead, the PA should only monitor the
overall level of the chosen indicator Q (through an independent environmental
authority, as proposed above), which might possibly reduce the monitoring costs
of the system, while the agents do not have to suﬀer the burden of the proof
that the environmental damage was lower than expected.
Moreover, the present proposal extends the application of the deposit-refund
system typical of the EB from the set of potential polluters to the set of the
visitors who would beneﬁt from avoiding pollution. As a consequence, the mech-
anism described above generates a strong interdependency between the ﬁrms’
and the visitors’ payoﬀs . T h ea i mo ft h ep a p e ri st os t u d yt h ed y n a m i c st h a t
arises in this context from the interaction between economic agents (ﬁrms and
visitors) and the PA.
For this purpose the choice process of ﬁrms and visitors is represented by a
two-population evolutionary game, where the population of ﬁrms strategically
interacts with that of visitors. The evolution of visitors’ and ﬁrms’ behaviour
is modelled using the so-called replicator dynamics (e.g., see Weibull 1995),
according to which a given choice spreads among the population as long as its
expected payoﬀ is greater than the average payoﬀ. As it emerges from the model,
such a dynamics may lead to a welfare-improving attractive Nash equilibrium,
in which all ﬁrms adopt the environmental-friendly technology and all potential
visitors choose to visit region R. The attraction basin of this equilibrium expands
as the reimbursement due to the visitors increases.
The paper has the following structure. Section 2 introduces the model and
4Section 3 provides the basic mathematical results. Section 4 concludes.
2 The model
L e tu sa s s u m et h a ta te a c hp e r i o do ft i m et potential visitors and ﬁrms play
a one-shot population game (i.e. all agents play the game simultaneously).
Each ﬁrm has to choose ex-ante whether to buy the EP and adopt the new
environmental-friendly technology (strategy F1) or to keep on using the old
polluting technology (strategy F2). Similarly, each potential visitor has to choose
ex-ante whether to buy the EC and visit the region R (strategy V1)o rg oo n
holidays somewhere else (strategy V2). Only the ﬁrms (potential visitors) that
adopt the new technology (who decide to visit region) can buy the EP (EC). We
assume that the potential visitors know ex-ante the criterion (speciﬁed below)
that is used by the PA to ﬁx the price of the EC, therefore they also know in
advance the maximum price that they might have to pay to visit the region. At
t h ee n do ft h et i m ep e r i o dt,t h ePA decides whether to reimburse ﬁrms and
visitors who bought the EP and the EC, respectively, on the basis of the data
on the environmental quality in region R that are released by an independent
environmental agency.
We assume the two populations to be constant over the time and normalise
to 1 the number of both potential visitors and ﬁrms. Let the variable x(t) denote
the share of ﬁrms choosing F1 at time t, 0 ≤ x(t) ≤ 1. Analogously, let y(t)
denote the share of potential visitors adopting choice V1 at time t, 0 ≤ y(t) ≤ 1
and let E(x) be their expected beneﬁt from the time spent in region R,t h a ti s
assumed to be positively correlated with x: the higher the proportion of ﬁrms
choosing the non-polluting technology, the higher the environmental quality that
the tourists can enjoy during their visit to the region.
Let us indicate with e p(x,y) the price (ﬁxed by the PA)o ft h eEC bought
by visitors choosing V1 (assumed to depend on the proportion of individuals
choosing V1 and of ﬁrms choosing F1); and with e rV (x,y)=αe p(x,y) the reim-
bursement due by the PA to these visitors when Q<Q,w h e r eα is a parameter
satisfying the condition 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 (α =1means that the amount e p is totally
reimbursed, whereas if α =0visitors are not reimbursed at all). Then, the
payoﬀ of a visitor buying the call option is E(x) − e p if the environmental goal
is attained (Q ≥ Q), whereas the payoﬀ is E(x) − e p + α · e p = E(x) − e p(1 − α)
in case it is not (Q<Q).
Denoting by θ(x) the probability that Q<Q (assumed to depend negatively
on the proportion of ﬁrms adopting the environment-friendly technology), the
expected payoﬀ of strategy V1 is, therefore, given by:
EV1(x,y)=E(x) − e p(x,y)+α · e p(x,y) · θ(x)=E(x) − e p(x,y)[1− α · θ(x)]
For the sake of simplicity, we assume:
E(x)=βx
5e p(x,y)=γ + δy + εx (1)
where β, γ, ε>0, δ R 0 and γ + δ>0.3
Notice that e p(x,y) is positively correlated to the number x of non-polluting
ﬁrms. As a matter of fact, the entries obtained by the PA from the visitors
through the call options EC can contribute to ﬁnance the ﬁrms that adopt the
innovative technology. Therefore, if x increases, the PA tends to increase the
price of the EC to ﬁnance the larger amount of the potential reimbursements
due to the non-polluting ﬁrms. Stated diﬀerently, the price paid by the visi-
tors increases as technological progress spreads among the ﬁrms of the region,
progressively improving its environmental quality Q.
The price of the EC, moreover, may be positively or negatively correlated to
the number of visitors y,a c c o r d i n gt ot h es i g no fδ. On the one hand, an increase
in the number of visitors raises the demand of call options which induces the PA
to increase their price (δ>0). On the other hand, an increase in the number
of visitors tends to enhance the entries available to the PA, therefore the latter
may have an incentive to reduce the price of the call option to attract an even
higher number of potential tourists (δ<0). The sign of δ, therefore, is a priori




This is equivalent to saying that if all ﬁrms adopt strategy F1 and invest in
the non-polluting technology (x =1 ), the environmental quality index Q will
certainly be above the threshold level Q (i.e., θ =0 ) and the visitors will not
be entitled to any reimbursement; whereas such an index will surely be below
Q (i.e., θ =1 , and visitors have to be reimbursed) if all ﬁrms choose strategy
F2 (x =0 ).
Under the assumptions above, the expected payoﬀ of strategy V1 becomes:
EV1(x,y)=βx− (γ + δy + εx)[1− α(1 − x)]
Without loss of generality, we can normalise to zero the payoﬀ of individuals
choosing V2 (i.e. who decide not to visit the region):
EV2(x,y)=0
3The latter condition ensures that the price of the call option h p is always strictly positive
for any possible value of x and y.
4Notice that the price of the call option is limited above, the upper bound being γ +δ + ε
if δ>0 (which occurs when x = y =1 ), and γ + ε if δ<0 (when x =1 , y =0 ). One can
imagine that the PA ﬁxes the values of the parameters γ, δ and ε such that the upper bound
is relatively low so that it does not discourage potential tourists (who know the value of the
upper bound in advance) from visiting the region. If so, the PA can attract tourism (through
the possibility of getting a reimbursement in case of an “unsatisfactory” holiday) and uses the
related entries as a fund raising mechanism to support the adoption of environmental-friendly
technologies in the region.
6Turning now to the ﬁrm’s decision process, if the environmental goal is
missed (Q<Q)t h ep r o ﬁts of a ﬁrm subscribing the put option are:
R(y) − cNP
where:
R(y) are the ﬁrm’s revenues, which are an increasing function of the number
y of visitors (and are independent of the adopted technology that is assumed to
aﬀect only the production costs);
cNP > 0 is a parameter representing the cost of the non-polluting technology
plus the cost of the put option sold by the PA.5
Whereas, in case the goal is achieved (Q ≥ Q), the proﬁts are given by:
R(y) − cNP + e rF(x,y)
where e rF(x,y) is the ﬁnancial aid received by a ﬁrm choosing F1 in case
Q ≥ Q.
Therefore, the expected proﬁts EF1 of the ﬁrms choosing strategy F1 are:
EF1(x,y)=R(y) − cNP + e rF(x,y) · (1 − θ(x))
where 1 − θ(x)=x: is the probability that Q ≥ Q.
I f ,i n s t e a d ,t h eﬁrm keeps on using the polluting technology (strategy F2),
its proﬁts are given by:
EF2(x,y)=R(y) − cP
where cP is the cost of the traditional (polluting) technology and it is: cNP >
cP > 0.
We assume:
e rF(x,y)=λ + µy + νx
where λ, µ>0 and ν T 0 are parameters ﬁxed by the PA.
Notice that the ﬁnancial aid received by a ﬁrm (e rF(x,y)) is positively related
to the number y of visitors choosing strategy V1.I no t h e rw o r d s ,a sp o i n t e do u t
above, the PA uses the entries deriving from the visitors’ subscription of the EC
to ﬁnance the ﬁrms’ adoption of new, low-impact technologies. Moreover, the
ﬁnancial aid may be positively or negatively related to the share of "clean" ﬁrms
x. In fact, on the one hand, an increase in x improves the environmental quality
of R; this tends to lower the likelihood that the PA will have to reimburse the
visitors, thus setting free more ﬁnancial resources that the PA can use to subsidy
5Observe that, for the sake of simplicity and without any loss of generality, the cost of the
EP can be set equal to zero. If so, the ﬁrms subscribing the EP w o u l dh a v et of a c eo n l ya
technological innovation cost. This would avoid one of the main criticisms that have been
moved to the use of the environmental bonds, namely, the potential liquidity problems that a
ﬁrm purchasing an environmental bond may suﬀer as long as it is not proved that its activity
did not cause any environmental damage (or, in the present case, as long as the overall level
of Q is unknown)
7the non-polluting ﬁrms. On the other hand, an increase in x implies that more
ﬁrms will be entitled to the ﬁnancial aid, thus reducing the reimbursement level
at disposal for each single ﬁrm.
The process of adopting strategies is modelled by the so called replicator
dynamics (see, e.g., Weibull, 1995), according to which the strategies whose ex-
pected payoﬀs are greater than the average payoﬀ spread within the populations













EF = x · EF1 +( 1− x) · EF2
EV = y · EV1 +( 1− y) · EV2
are the average payoﬀs of the populations of ﬁrms and visitors, respectively.
The replication equations system (2) can be written as follows:
·
x = x(1 − x)(EF1 − EF2)=x(1 − x)F(x,y) (3)
·
y = y(1 − y)(EV1 − EV2)=y(1 − y)G(x,y)
where:
F(x,y)=−(cNP − cP)+λx + µxy + νx2
G(x,y)=−γ(1 − α)+[ β − αγ − ε(1 − α)]x − δ(1 − α)y − αδxy − αεx2
(4)
We assume the parameters to satisfy the following conditions:
C1)0 ≤ α ≤ 1
C2) cNP >c P > 0
C3) β,γ,ε > 0; δ S 0; γ + δ>0
C4) λ,µ > 0; ν S 0
C5) λ + µy + ν>c NP − cP ∀ y ∈ [0,1]
C6) β>γ+ δy + ε ∀ y ∈ [0,1]
(5)
We have already discussed above conditions C1) − C4). As to condition
C5), this means that, no matter what the number of visitors y is, non-polluting
8industries will certainly be ﬁnanced if their share is suﬃciently high (x ∼ 1)
(since in that case
·
x>0 ∀ y ∈ [0,1] and consequently θ =0 ). Analogously,
condition C6) implies that, no matter what the number of visitors is, if the share
of non-polluting industries is suﬃciently high (x ∼ 1)t h es t r a t e g yV1 turns out
t ob et h em o r er e m u n e r a t i v eo n e( i . e .EV1(x,y) >E V 2(x,y)), therefore at the
end of the holidays the tourists will be satisﬁed with their choice of coming to
visit region R.
3 Analysis of the model
Let us consider the dynamic system (3) whose parameters satisfy (5).S y s t e m
(3) is deﬁned in [0,1]
2, namely in the unit square S:
S = {(x,y):0≤ x ≤ 1,0 ≤ y ≤ 1}.
All sides of this square are invariant, namely, if the pair (x,y) initially lies
on one side, then the whole correspondent trajectory also lies on that side. The
following Proposition holds ∀α 6=1 .6
Proposition 1 The four vertices of [0,1]
2 are equilibria of (3). In particular,
(0,0) and (1,1) are attractors, while (1,0) and (0,1) are saddles.
Proof. Writing the Jacobian matrix J at the vertices of [0,1]
2,i ti se a s yt o
check that from conditions (5) it follows that: detJ(0,0) > 0; detJ(1,1) > 0;
detJ(1,0) < 0; detJ(0,1) < 0;m o r e o v e r ,trace J(0,0) < 0; trace J(1,1) < 0.
This proves the proposition.
Notice that in the four vertices of the square, only one strategy is played
by ﬁrms and potential visitors. In particular, in the attractor (1,1) all ﬁrms
adopt the non-polluting technology and all potential tourists choose to visit the
region, as they are attracted by its high environmental quality deriving from the
widespread adoption in the region of new, environmental-friendly technologies.
The opposite holds in the attractor (0,0):a l lﬁrms keep on using the traditional
technology causing high pollution in the region, therefore none of the potential
tourists decides to come to visit R.I n(0,1) all ﬁrms are polluting, nevertheless
all potential visitors choose to spend their holidays in the region R.I nt h i s
case, therefore, the visitors are attracted by the reimbursement received rather
than by the environmental quality of R.T h i sﬁxed point might describe the
case of some popular tourist destinations where -despite the low environmental
quality (e.g. polluted sea and crowded beaches)- tourists are mainly attracted
by the low costs of the area (which is equivalent to getting a reimbursement
that lowers the holiday costs in the present case). Notice, however, that this
ﬁxed point is non attractive, therefore it is not a Nash equilibrium of the model.
Mutatis mutandis, the same reasoning (and dynamic features) obviously apply
to the saddle point (1,0): although the quality of the environment of region R
6See below (at the end of this section) for the case α =1 .
9is extremely high (all ﬁrms being non-polluting), potential visitors care more
for the holiday costs than for the environmental quality of R, therefore in this
case they do not come to the region since there is no chance of reimbursement.
Beyond the vertices of the unit square S,s y s t e m( 3) can have two more
possible equilibria on the boundaries and up to three equilibria in the interior of
S (see Propositions 5 and 6 in the Appendix). All these additional (boundary
or internal) equilibria are either sources or saddles (i.e. unstable equilibria).
Moreover, it can be shown (see Proposition 7 in the Appendix) that there cannot
exist any limit cycle in (0,1)
2 (i.e. inside the square S). It follows that “almost
every” trajectory of system (3) (i.e. excluded those belonging to a zero-measure
subset of the square [0,1]
2) approaches one of the attracting vertices of the
square.7 Therefore, no matter what the initial conditions are, the dynamics of
the system will almost always lead to one of the two attractors of the square.
Figure 1 describes the dynamic regimes that may emerge in the model when
the highest possible number of internal equilibria occurs. Attractors, repellors
and saddle points are represented in the ﬁgure by full dots, empty dots and
squares, respectively. The attraction basins of (0,0) and (1,1) are separated in
the ﬁgure by the bold line that connects the two boundary equilibria (x1,1) and
(x2,0). This separatrix is constituted by the union of the stable manifolds of
the boundary saddle points (x1,1) and (x2,0) and of the internal saddle point
Q2. As the arrows in the ﬁgure show, the dynamics are path dependent. As a
matter of fact, if the initial levels of ﬁrms and tourists that buy the options are
suﬃciently high (i.e. x and y are above the separatrix), then all the other agents
will tend to imitate their behaviour and the system will eventually converge
towards (1,1). If, on the contrary, the initial values of x and y are suﬃciently
low (i.e. below the threshold level given by the separatrix), then the opposite
strategies F2 and V2 will tend to spread among the populations of ﬁrms and
potential visitors and the system will converge towards (0,0). Although the
morphology of the attraction basins may diﬀer from one case to the other, similar
"threshold eﬀects" emerge also in the other cases, regardless of the number
(from zero to three) and stability features (saddles or repellors) of the internal
equilibria. Figure 2, for instance, shows the case in which there exists only
one (saddle point) equilibrium in the interior of the unit square and its stable
manifolds (the bold line) separates the basins of attraction of (0,0) and (1,1).A s
the arrows show, even in this case the system will eventually converge towards
one of these two attractors depending on whether the initial values of x and y
lie above or below the separatrix.
Let us now compare the expected payoﬀs of the agents in the attracting
vertices.
Proposition 2 Under the assumptions C1 −C6,t h ee q u i l i b r i u m(1,1) Pareto-
dominates the other attracting equilibrium (0,0) of system (3); i.e. EV1(1,1) >
EV2(0,0) and EF1(1,1) >E F 2(0,0).
7The system does not converge to one of the attracting vertices only when it lies in one of
the other equilibria or along one of the stable manifolds of the saddle points.
10Proof. Notice that the expected payoﬀs evaluated in (1,1) and (0,0) are,
respectively:
EV1(1,1) = β − (γ + δ + ε)
EF1(1,1) = R(1) − cNP +( λ + µ + ν)
and
EV2(0,0) = 0
EF2(0,0) = R(0) − cP
where it is always EF1(1,1) >E F 2(0,0) under assumption C5 and EV1(1,1) >
EV2(0,0) under assumption C6.
From the Proposition above it follows that (1,1) is a “virtuous equilibrium”
since the region achieves the highest possible levels of environmental quality and
tourism, and all agents (visitors and ﬁrms) are better-oﬀ than in the alternative
sink (0,0) of system (3). The latter, on the contrary, may be interpreted as
a "poverty trap"8 to which the system may converge, leading to a "vicious
equilibrium" in which the region R is extremely polluted and unable to attract
any tourist. To minimize this risk, therefore, the PA will try to ﬁxt h ep a r a m e t e r
values so as to maximize the attraction basin of (1,1),t h u si n c r e a s i n ga sm u c h
as possible the set of initial values of x and y that make the system converge to
the virtuous equilibrium. The following Proposition describes one possible way
in which the PA may achieve this goal.
Proposition 3 The basin of attraction of (1,1) expands as α increases.
Proof. As it can be easily veriﬁed (see the Mathematical Appendix), if α<1
the basins of attraction of the equilibria (1,1) and (0,0) are separated by a
curve formed by the union of the stable manifolds of the saddle points (see, for
instance, Figures 1 and 2). This separatrix is the graph of a decreasing function






x < 0,i f
·
x 6=0 .
Let us indicate by e Yα1(x) the separatrix corresponding to α = α1.N o t i c e
that if α increases (ceteris paribus), the value of
·
y increases while that of
·
x
remains constant. It follows that setting α = α2 >α 1 the locus e Yα1(x) is
crossed from the left to the right by the trajectories of system (3) with α = α2.
This implies that the basin of attraction of (1,1) for α = α2 is greater than for
α = α1.
Therefore, by increasing the reimbursement share α the PA can enhance
the attraction basin of the ﬁrst best outcome. In other words, the higher the
reimbursement share α, the lower the initial values of x and y that are needed to
8By this term we mean a situation in which private rational decisions lead to outcomes
that are not optimal from a social viewpoint.
11converge to (1,1).I ft h i si st h ec a s e ,i ti ss u ﬃcient that a lower initial number
of ﬁrms (visitors) choose the ﬁnancial instruments proposed by the PA (EP and
EC, respectively) to convince all other ﬁrms (potential visitors) to imitate their
choice and behave the same way.
The attraction basin of (1,1) will obviously be maximum when α =1(i.e.
the price of the call-option is totally reimbursed if the environmental goal is
missed) and minimum when α =0(i.e. no reimbursement occurs). Notice that
in the latter case the price paid by the tourists becomes simply a tourist tax,
that is, an entrance ticket that tourists pay to have access to the region.
We can conclude that the ﬁnancial mechanism proposed here (that allows
visitors to be refunded in case of an unsatisfactory environmental quality) is
more likely to lead the system towards the virtuous equilibrium (1,1) than
the traditional entrance ticket without any refund possibility. Moreover, by
proposing total reimbursement in case of low environmental quality, the PA
actually minimizes the probability of refunding the tourists since this maximizes
the attraction basin of the non-polluted equilibrium (1,1).
Interestingly enough, as it can be easily veriﬁed, when α =1(total reim-
bursement) there exists a continuum of equilibria along the side x =0(rather
than the only attracting equilibrium (0,0)) and a unique trajectory leading to
each of them (see Figure 3). This implies that, if the initial values of x and y
are suﬃciently low (i.e. below the separatrix ), we can have any number of vis-
itors at the equilibrium depending on the initial situation. In this case we have
minimum environmental quality (all ﬁrms being polluting) and maximum reim-
bursement, therefore it is not possible to predict a priori whether the tourists
will be more attracted by the possibility of being totally reimbursed or more
discouraged by the degradation of the environmental quality in region R.A sa
matter of fact, in this case the expected payoﬀ of strategy V1 (visit the region)
equals zero and the potential visitors will be indiﬀerent between coming or not
coming to the region (i.e. EV1 = EV2).
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The present paper has suggested an innovative ﬁnancial mechanism that the PA
of a tourist region may adopt to attract visitors while protecting the environ-
ment. On the one hand, the PA sells to the tourists an environmental call option
that gives them the possibility of getting a reimbursement if the environmental
quality in the region turns out to be unsatisfactory (i.e. below a given threshold
level). On the other hand, the PA oﬀers the ﬁrms that adopt an innovative,
non-polluting technology the possibility of getting a reimbursement to cover the
additional costs imposed by the new technology if the environmental quality
turns out to be suﬃciently good (i.e. above the threshold level).
Since the two kinds of reimbursements (to visitors and ﬁrms) are linked to
the same environmental index, they will tend to compensate each other. More
precisely, if the environmental quality target is achieved, the entries that the
PA gets from selling the call options to the visitors plus those possibly earned
12from selling the put options to the ﬁrms contribute to ﬁnance the ﬁnancial aid
given to the non-polluting ﬁrms. If, on the contrary, the environmental quality
target is missed, the entries earned by the PA ﬁnance the reimbursements due
to the visitors. The fund-raising mechanism proposed here, therefore, could be
a useful instrument to promote and spread across the ﬁrms a technological shift
from a polluting technology towards a more environmental-friendly one.
The mechanism described above extends to a two-population game the deposit-
r e f u n ds y s t e m st h a th a v eb e e na p p l i e di ns o m es p e c i ﬁc contexts and that provide
the basic idea underlying the environmental bonds proposed in the literature.
Diﬀerently from these instruments, however, in the present case the burden of
the proof does not fall on the holder of the ﬁnancial instrument, since the re-
imbursement is linked to the observed performance of an overall environmental
quality index. This may have a twofold eﬀect: on the one hand, it reduces the
costs that a ﬁrm may encounter to prove ex-post that its activity did not actually
damage the environment and, on the other hand, it generates a strong interde-
pendency between the choices of the two populations (ﬁrms and visitors). The
present mechanism, moreover, can reduce the risk of moral hazard behaviour
that may arise with the environmental bonds. The latter instrument, in fact,
may induce the PA to overestimate the environmental degradation provoked
by a single ﬁrm to avoid refunding it, whereas in the present case the reim-
bursement depends on the observed values of an environmental quality index
measured by an independent external agency.
As shown in the paper, the system is characterized by a multiplicity of
possible equilibria (up to six ﬁxed points along the boundaries and up to three
in the interior of the unit square). From the dynamics that emerge in the model
it turns out that only two of these possible equilibria are attractors (namely,
the ﬁxed points (1,1) and (0,0)) and that almost all trajectories will converge
to them, since no limit cycle may occur in the interior of the unit square. In
both attractors, all the agents of each population choose the same strategy.
Both ﬁrms and tourists would be better-oﬀ at the "virtuous equilibrium" (1,1)
in which all ﬁrms adopt the non-polluting technology and all potential visitors
come to visit the region. However, the trajectories deriving from the interaction
between the two populations may also lead to an attracting poverty trap in
which all ﬁrms are polluting and no tourist come to the region (0,0).
Whether the system will converge to the ﬁrst-best equilibrium or to the al-
ternative attractor will depend on the initial share of ﬁrms (x)a n dp o t e n t i a l
tourists (y) that buy the environmental call and put options oﬀered by the PA.
If these shares are suﬃciently high, then the system is likely to converge to
the virtuous equilibrium (1,1), otherwise it may end up in a Pareto-dominated
attracting equilibrium from which the PA may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to escape. The
ﬁnal outcome towards which the system will eventually converge is, therefore,
strongly path-dependent for the existence of threshold eﬀects and imitative be-
haviors that spread the most remunerative strategy across the agents within
each population. The PA, however, can aﬀect these threshold eﬀects by modi-
fying the reimbursement share due to the visitors in case of a low environmental
quality in the region. If the PA aims at simultaneously achieving the maximum
13environmental quality and the maximum number of tourists, it should oﬀer to-
tal reimbursement to the visitors as this maximizes the attraction basin of the
virtuous equilibrium (1,1). If, on the contrary, the PA levies a simple entrance
ticket on the tourists with no chance of being reimbursed, this minimizes the
attraction basin of (1,1), increasing the critical mass of x and y that are needed
to escape the poverty trap (0,0). Increasing the reimbursement share, therefore,
might paradoxically lower the costs of the ﬁnancial mechanism for the PA:i f
t h es y s t e mc o n v e r g e st o(1,1) no reimbursement will be paid by the PA to the
tourists and the entries obtained from the call options can be used by the PA
to ﬁnance the ﬁrms for their virtuous (non-polluting) behaviour.
In our opinion, the present analysis could be extended in several directions in
the future. In particular, using an optimal control model in which the PA aims
at maximising its own objective function, it would be interesting to compare
the costs for the PA of the two alternative regimes described above (with and
without reimbursement) taking its budget constraint explicitly into account.
However, further research will be needed to investigate this problem in the
future.
5 Mathematical appendix
This section provides a complete characterization of the possible dynamics of
system (3) and of all the additional equilibria that may exist beyond the vertices
of the unit square [0,1]
2.
Recall the expressions of F(x,y) and G(x,y) in (4). The additional equilibria
of system (3) not coinciding with the vertices of the unit square [0,1]
2 are given
by:
• The intersections between the locus F(x,y)=0and the edges of [0,1]
2
with y =1and y =0 .
• The intersections between the locus G(x,y)=0and the edges of [0,1]
2
with x =1and x =0 .
• The intersections between the loci F(x,y)=0and G(x,y)=0in the
interior of [0,1]
2.
In order to study the existence and stability of equilibria of system (3), we
prove the following Propositions.
Proposition 4 The intersection of F(x,y)=0with the square [0,1]
2 is the
graph of a decreasing function y = f(x) deﬁned in an interval [x1,x 2], 0 <
x1 <x 2 < 1,w i t hf(x1)=1and f(x2)=0 . Analogously, the intersection
of G(x,y)=0with the square [0,1]
2 is the graph of a function y = g(x) such
that:
• if δ>0, y = g(x) is an increasing function deﬁned in an interval [x3,x 4],
0 <x 3 <x 4 < 1,w i t hg(x3)=0and g(x4)=1 ;
14• if δ<0 and γ + δ ≥ 0, y = g(x) is a decreasing function deﬁned in an
interval [x5,x 6], 0 ≤ x5 <x 6 < 1,w i t hg(x5)=1and g(x6)=0 .
Proof. The intersections of F(x,y)=0and G(x,y)=0with [0,1]
2 are,















−γ (1 − α)+( β − αγ − ε(1 − α))x − αεx2
1 − α + αx
¶
(7)
It follows from conditions (5) that
lim
x→0+
f(x)=+ ∞, f(1) < 0
and that f(x) either has no extreme (if ν>0) or has a negative maximum
and a positive minimum point (if ν<0). Hence the intersection of y = f(x) with
[0,1]
2 is the graph of a decreasing function deﬁned in [x1,x 2], 0 <x 1 <x 2 < 1,
with f(x1)=1and f(x2)=0 .
Analogously one can check that
g(0) < 0, g(1) > 1 if δ>0
g(0) > 1, g(1) < 0 if δ<0, γ + δ>0
and that g(x) has a negative minimum (maximum) and a positive maximum
(minimum) point if δ>0 (δ<0). This proves the statements of the proposition.
Let us now classify all the boundary equilibria.
Proposition 5 System (3) has six equilibria on the boundary of [0,1]
2, i.e.
the four vertices plus P1 =( x1,1) and P2 =( x2,0). The two vertices (0,0) and
(1,1) are attractors, while (0,1) and (1,0) are saddles. Moreover, P1 is a saddle
or a repellor if, respectively, G(x1,1) is > 0 or < 0;w h e r e a sP2 is a saddle or
a repellor if, respectively, G(x2,0) is < 0 or > 0.
Proof. All the statements of the proposition are easily proved by writing the
expression of the Jacobian matrix and verifying the sign of its trace and deter-
minant at each boundary equilibrium.
Proposition 6 The internal equilibria of system (3) c a nb e0 ,1 ,2o r3 .M o r e
precisely:
• if δ>0, there is at most one internal equilibrium, which is a saddle, if it
exists;
• if δ<0, the number of internal equilibria (counted by their multiplicity)
is even if G(x1,1) · G(x2,0) > 0 ,o d di fG(x1,1) · G(x2,0) < 0;
15• no internal equilibrium is attractive: in particular, there exist at most one
internal saddle and at most two internal repellors.
Proof. Obviously y = f(x) and y = g(x) have at most three intersections in
(0,1)









trace(J(Q)) = x∗ (1 − x∗) ∂F
∂x (x∗,y∗)+y∗ (1 − y∗) ∂G
∂y (x∗,y∗)
Recalling conditions (5), it is easily checked that detJ(Q) < 0 if δ>0;
while, if δ<0
detJ(Q) ≷ 0 iﬀ |f0 (x∗)| ≷ |g0 (x∗)|
Moreover, when δ<0,b e i n gy = f(x) and y = g(x) both decreasing in
[0,1]
2, it follows that ∂F
∂x, ∂G
∂y and thus trace(J(Q)) are positive.
Finally, suppose that δ<0 and three internal equilibria exist, say Q1 =
(x∗
1,y∗
1), Q2 =( x∗
2,y∗





3. Then it is easily observed
that |f0 (x∗
i)| > |g0 (x∗
i)| when i =1 ,3,w h e r e a s|f0 (x∗
2)| < |g0 (x∗
2)|.
Clearly the previous considerations imply all the statements of the proposi-
tion.
The phase portrait of system (3) can be fully described by combining the
results of the previous Propositions with the following one.
Proposition 7 System (3) admits no limit cycle in (0,1)
2.
Proof. Due to the index Theorem (see, for example, Guckenheimer and Holmes,
1983) and the results of Proposition 6, a possible limit cycle in (0,1)
2 must
surround some repellor (precisely, either one repellor or two repellors and one
saddle). Because of Proposition 6, this implies δ<0. Hence, let Q =( x∗,y∗)
be an internal repellor. It is easily checked that either P1 =( x1,1) or P2 =
(x2,0) is such that no other equilibrium exists in the strip [x1,x ∗]x[0,1] (or
[x∗,x 2]x[0,1]) and, correspondingly, P1,o rP2,i sas a d d l e .
Assume this is true for P1 (mutatis mutandis the same applies to P2)a n d
consider the triangoloid T = {x1 ≤ x ≤ x∗, g(x) ≤ y ≤ f(x)},w i t hsides L1 =
{x = x1, g(x1) ≤ y ≤ 1}, L2 = {x1 ≤ x ≤ x∗, y = g(x)}, L3 = {x1 ≤ x ≤ x∗, y = f(x)}.
Then it is easily observed that the vector ﬁeld points outward T along L1 ∪
L2∪L3 and there must exist a separatrix in T between the trajectories crossing
L1 ∪ L2 and those crossing L3. It follows that such a separatrix must be a
trajectory joining P1 and Q, which can be represented by the graph of some
decreasing function y = h(x), x1 ≤ x ≤ x∗.T h u sQ cannot be surrounded by a
limit cycle. The same argument holds if P1 is replaced by P2.
Being excluded the existence of limit cycle, then “almost every” trajectory
of system (3) approaches one of the two attracting vertices of the square [0,1]
2.
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